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Maternal Substance Abuse: The Next
Step in the Protection of Fetal Rights?
Guillermo, a newborn at Broward General Medical Center in
Ft. Lauderdale, has spent his whole short life crying. He is jit-
tery and goes into spasms when he is touched. His eyes don't
focus. He can't stick out his tongue, or suck. Born a week ago
to a cocaine addict, Guillermo is described by his doctors as an
addict himself.'
I. Introduction
There exists a vital link between the quality of life experienced
in utero and the quality of life enjoyed or possibly suffered after
birth. This relationship between mother and child in utero has come
under increased scrutiny throughout the country. In California,
when Thomas Monson was born on November 23, 1985, with mas-
sive brain damage, criminal charges were filed against Thomas'
mother.' Thomas' fatal disabilities were caused by his mother's use
of amphetamines during pregnancy against doctor's orders, by her
failure to seek prompt medical attention when she began hemorrhag-
ing the day she gave birth, and by her act of sexual intercourse after
the hemorrhaging began.$ In Maryland a physician petitioned the
Baltimore Circuit Court for an order to enjoin a pregnant woman in
her seventh month of pregnancy from continuing to use narcotic
drugs. The petition alleged that the drug abuse was retarding the
growth and development of her unborn child and endangering its po-
tential life." In Michigan a woman was charged with abuse and neg-
1. Cocaine Babies: Hooked at Birth, NEWSWEEK, July 28, 1986, at 56 [hereinafter Co-
caine Babies].
2. Moss, Fetal Abuse Isn't A Crime, 73 A.B.A. J., Apr. 1987, at 37 [hereinafter Fetal
Abuse]. See also Balisy, Maternal Substance Abuse: The Need to Provide Legal Protection
for the Fetus, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1209 (1987) [hereinafter Maternal Substance Abuse]; L.A.
Times, Oct. I, 1986, § II, at I, col. 4.
3. Fetal Abuse, supra note 2. Pamela Rae Stewart Monson was arrested and charged
under a state statute that requires parents to furnish clothing, food, shelter, and medical care
for their child or fetus. San Diego Municipal Court Judge E. Mac Amos dismissed the charges
against the woman because the statute used to charge her was not applicable to her situation,
but was intended by Congress to apply to fathers who are delinquent in paying child support.
4. Feldman, Leading Them To Water and Making Them Drink, 13 LEGAL ASPECTS
MED. PRAC. I (Dec. 1985) [hereinafter Leading Them To Water]. The physician also re-
quested that the potential mother's drug use be monitored through routine urinalysis and other
tests in order to determine the infant's status and need for medical care. See also Shaw, Con-
ditional Prospective Rights of the Fetus, 5 THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL MEDICINE 63 (1984)
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lect of her child. Her extensive heroin ingestion during pregnancy
resulted in the birth of a heroin-addicted newborn who suffered
symptoms of drug withdrawal within twenty-four hours of birth.5
This Comment will examine the legal relationship between the
mother and the unborn child, the ramifications when this relation-
ship is abused, and the present status of the unborn's rights. Part II
of this Comment reviews the protection afforded the unborn in the
area of tort liability and the adequacy of this common law protec-
tion. Part III addresses the failure of the criminal law to recognize a
stillborn fetus as a person and the ensuing need for reform of crimi-
nal statutes in the area of fetal rights. Part IV analyzes the current
medical knowledge about the effects of substance abuse on a fetus as
well as the advances being made in fetal therapy and the impact this
progress may have on the development of fetal rights. Part V exam-
ines the need to readjust the balance between the rights of women
and the evolving rights of the fetus as their rights become diametri-
cally opposed when a woman willfully abuses substances during
pregnancy.
II. Protection Afforded by Prenatal Tort
A. Historic Perspective
In the state court system, a clear trend6 has emerged allowing
[hereinafter Prospective Rights] (The author noted that the physician informed the court that
the mother used substantial amounts of quaalude, valium, morphine, and cocaine and that a
previous child had been born prematurely and addicted. The mother was ultimately ordered to
enroll in a drug rehabilitation program and submit to weekly urinalysis until the birth of the
baby.); Silas, An Issue Is Born, 71 A.B.A. J. Aug. 1985, at 21 [hereinafter Issue] (This article
reported that another Maryland court was asked to determine whether a woman addicted to
drugs could be ordered to enter a rehabilitation program to prevent her unborn child from
becoming addicted. A final ruling was never issued because the mother voluntarily entered the
program.).
5. In re Baby X, 97 Mich. App. Ill, 293 N.W.2d 736 (1980). The court held that
limited recognition of a child en ventre sa mere as a child is appropriate when such recognition
is for the child's best interest. As a result, the court concluded that, "[slince a child has a legal
right to begin life with a sound mind and body, we believe it is within his best interest to
examine all prenatal conduct bearing on that right." Id. at 739. See also Reyes v. State, 75
Cal. App. 3d 214, 141 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1977). In Reyes, a California woman was criminally
charged for using heroin during the last two months of her pregnancy and giving birth to twin
boys who were both born addicted to heroin. The court held that the California Penal Code
did not cover unborn children. CAL. PENAL CODE § 273a(l) (West 1970).
6. Thirty jurisdictions have recognized a claim by a fetus for wrongful death caused by
injuries incurred during gestation. Simmons v. Howard Univ., 323 F. Supp. 529 (D.D.C.
1971); Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 293 Ala. 95, 300 So. 2d 354 (1974); Hatala v.
Markiewicz, 26 Conn. Supp. 358, 224 A.2d 406 (1966); Worgan v. Greggo & Ferrara, Inc.,
128 A.2d 557 (Del. Super. Ct. 1956); Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100
(1955); Jones v. Karraker, 109 I11. App. 3d 363, 440 N.E.2d 420, aff'd 98 111.2d 487, 457
N.E.2d 23 (1982); Britt v. Sears, 150 Ind. App. 487, 277 N.E.2d 20 (1972); Hale v. Manion,
189 Kan. 143, 368 P.2d 1 (1962); Rice v. Rizk, 453 S.W.2d 732 (Ky. 1970); Wascom v.
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recovery for injuries that result in the death of the fetus en ventre sa
mere.7 In recognizing a wrongful death action for a fetus, such states
have made tremendous headway in the area of fetal rights. The sem-
inal case for negligently inflicted prenatal torts was decided by Jus-
tice Holmes in Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northhampton.8
In Dietrich, Justice Holmes denied a cause of action for the
wrongful death of a fetus who was born prematurely when his
mother slipped and fell upon a defective highway. Even though the
fetus itself did not sustain injuries, it was not able to survive its pre-
mature birth caused by the injury to the mother. Justice Holmes
reasoned that because the unborn child was part of the mother at the
time of the injury, any damage incurred could be recovered through
suit by the mother.' The only duty that Justice Holmes felt might be
owed to one "not yet in being" was possibly a civil duty. The fetus,
however, was not considered a person and, therefore, could not main-
tain an action against a negligent tortfeasor who had caused him
injury in his mother's womb.10 In other words, the fetus was wholly
without any rights.
For the next sixty years, courts followed Dietrich and denied the
fetus a cause of action for prenatal injuries. The justifications for
such denial included: 1) the absence of any duty owed to an unborn
child because he or she was considered to be part of the mother; 2)
the inability to show a causal relationship between the wrongful act
American Indem. Corp., 383 So. 2d 1037 (La. App. 1980); Odham v. Sherman, 234 Md. 179,
198 A.2d 71 (1964); Mone v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 368 Mass. 354, 331 N.E.2d 916 (1975);
O'Neill v. Morse, 385 Mich. 130, 188 N.W.2d 785 (1971); Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn.
365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949); Rainey v. Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 72 So. 2d 434 (1954); O'Grady
v. Brown, 654 S.W.2d 904 (Mo. 1983); White v. Yup, 85 Nev. 527, 458 P.2d 617 (1969);
Poliquin v. MacDonald, 101 N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 249 (1957); Salazar v. St. Vincent Hospital,
95 N.M. 150, 619 P.2d 826 (1980); Hopkins v. McBane, 359 N.W.2d 862 (N.D. 1984);
Stidman v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 167 N.E.2d 106 (1959); Evans v. Olson, 550 P.2d
924 (Okla. 1976); Libbee v. Permanente Clinic, 268 Or. 258, 518 P.2d 636 (1974); Amadio v.
Levin, 509 Pa. 199, 501 A.2d 1085 (1985) Presley v. Newport Hosp., 117 R.I. 177, 365 A.2d
748 (1976); Fowler v. Woodward, 244 S.C. 608, 138 S.E.2d 42 (1964); Vailancourt v. Medical
Center Hospital of Vermont, Inc., 139 Vt. 138, 425 A.2d 92 (1980); Moen v. Hanson, 85
Wash. 2d 597, 537 P.2d 266 (1975); Baldwin v. Butcher, 155 W. Va. 431, 184 S.E.2d 428
(1971); Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto Inc. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 148 N.W.2d 107 (1967).
See also Annotation, Right to Maintain Action to Recover Damages For Death of Unborn
Child, 84 A.L.R.3d 411 (1978, Supp. 1987).
7. Translated from French, "en ventre sa mere" literally means "[in its mother's
womb." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 479 5th ed. 1979).
8. 138 Mass. 14, 52 Am. Rep. 242 (1884). Cf. Kline v. Zuckerman, 4 Pa. D. & C. 227
(1924) (child born with a deformity caused by the negligence of another brought successful
cause of action against the wrongdoer for injuries sustained while it was "quick in the womb").
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has since effectively overruled Dietrich in Keyes
v. Construction Services, Inc., 340 Mass. 499, 165 N.E.2d 912 (1960).
9. Dietrich, 138 Mass. at 17, - Am. Rep. at __ .
10. Id. at 16, __ Am. Rep. at _ .
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and the injury to the child; 3) the potential for engendering spurious
or fraudulent claims; and 4) the possibility of establishing precedent
that would encourage children to bring suit against their mothers for
negligent behavior during pregnancy.11 The modern trend toward the
recognition of such an action repudiates some of these historical
"justifications," but some still remain.
In Bonbrest v. Kotz, a court recognized a fetus as a distinct
individual having standing to maintain an action for its prenatal in-
juries for the first time.12 As in Dietrich, the fetus in Bonbrest sur-
vived his prenatal injuries sustained during his delivery and was sub-
sequently born alive.' 3 The court in Bonbrest, however, rejected
Justice Holmes' reasoning that a viable child was "part" of its
mother.1 ' Even though the fetus was still dependent upon the mother
for continued sustenance, it was capable of "extrauterine life."'' The
concept of viability continues to be the focus of controversy even
today.
In further overcoming the hurdles erected in Dietrich, the Bon-
brest court rejected Justice Holmes' contention that recovery of
damages by the mother would be adequate recovery for the fetus'
damages. The court recognized that if the fetus after birth was left
with no recovery, there would be "a wrong inflicted for which there
is no remedy."'" Without such recovery a "residuum of injury"
would go uncompensated and the child would be compelled to bear
the "seal of another's fault.' 7 The Dietrich court had alluded to the
difficulty that accompanies proof of what it labeled as "remote"' 8
injuries. The Bonbrest court, however, overcame this contention by
designating the question of causation as the responsibility of the trial
court and by affirming the presumption that the law keeps pace with
the sciences.' 9
11. See Fleisher, Liability for Prenatal Injury, 20 Hosp, LAW, July 1987, at 97 [herein-
after Prenatal Injury].
12. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946). The judge noted that an important factual distinc-
tion between Bonbrest and Dietrich was that the injury in Dietrich was an indirect one
through the mother, whereas the injury in Bonbrest was a direct injury to a viable child. Id. at
140.
13. Id.
14. The court noted that Justice Holmes' reasoning was contradictory. The court asked,
"[w]hy a 'part' of the mother under the law of negligence and a separate entity and person in
that of property and crime?".
15. Id. The court supported this view with reference to cases of "living children being
taken from dead mothers."
16. Id. at 141.
17. Id.
18. Dietrich, 138 Mass. at 17, - Am. Rep. at __.
19. Bonbrest, 65 F. Supp. at 143. See also W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, HANDBOOK ON
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The Bonbrest court not only established a duty running to the
unborn by recognizing the unborn as a distinct individual, but also
properly charged that the determination of proof of causation was
the responsibility of the trial court. Once the cause of action was
established, the extent of its scope of protection came into dispute.
B. Limitations on Prenatal Torts
1. Viability.-The first limitation imposed on recovery for pre-
natal injury was the legal status of the fetus at the time of injury.20
Several states have only allowed recovery for injuries sustained from
the point of viability;21 others have allowed recovery from the point
of conception. 22 The arguments supporting the use of the point of
conception as the criterion for recovery are very persuasive.
The point of conception standard was used by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in Sinkler v. Kneale.2a The Sinkler court rejected
THE LAW OF TORTS, § 55 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter W. PROSSER]. The author noted that
"[ais far as causation is concerned, there will certainly be cases in which there are difficulties
of proof, but they should be no more frequent, nor the difficulties any greater, than as to many
other medical problems."
20. See Prenatal Injury, supra note 11. See also Annotation, Liability for Prenatal In-
quiries, 40 A.L.R.3d 1222 (1971, Supp. 1987).
21. See, e.g., Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F. Supp. 56, 62-63 (N.D. Iowa 1960) (predicting Iowa
decision based on modern trend); Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 637, 92 P.2d 678,
683-84 (1939), cited with approval in Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 570, 565 P.2d 122,
126, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97, 101 (1977); Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 440, 79 A.2d 550,
561 (1950); Steggal v. Morris, 363 Mo. 1224, 1233, 258 S.W.2d 557, 581 (1953); Weaks v.
Mounter, 88 Nev. 118, 121-22, 493 P.2d 1307, 1309 (1972) (dicta); Stetson v. Easterling, 274
N.D, 152, 156, 161 S.E.2d 531, 534 (1968); Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit Inc., 152 Ohio
St. 114, 128-29, 87 N.E.2d 334, 340 (1949); Evans v. Olson, 550 P.2d 924, 927 (Okla. 1976);
Mallison v. Pomeroy, 205 Or. 690, 697, 291 P.2d 225, 228 (1955); Seattle-First Nat'l. Bank v.
Rakin, 59 Wash. 2d 288, 291, 367 P.2d 835, 838 (1962).
22. See, e.g., Wolfe v. Isbell, 291 Ala. 327, 333-34, 280 So. 2d 758, 763 (1973); Simon
v. Mullin, 34 Conn. Supp. 139, 147, 380 A.2d 1353, 1357 (1977); Day v. Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co., 328 So. 2d 560, 562 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line
Co., 212 Ga. 504, 504-05, 93 S.E.2d 727, 728 (1956); Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 II1. 2d
348, 357, 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1255 (1977); Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 486, 147 A.2d
108, 110 (1958); Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 367, 157 A.2d 497, 504 (1960); Sinkler v.
Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 273-74, 164 A.2d 93, 96 (1960); Sylvia v. Gobeille, 101 R.I. 76, 79, 220
A.2d 222, 224 (1966). But see Stern v. Miller, 348 So. 2d 303, 308 (Fla. 1977) (denial for
wrongful death of stillborn).
23. 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in
Sinkler, which was the initial case in Pennsylvania allowing recovery for prenatal injuries for a
fetus subsequently born alive, overruled its twenty-year-old appellate decision in Berlin v. J.C.
Penney Co., 339 Pa. 547, 16 A.2d 28 (1940). Four lower court decisions have addressed the
issue of prenatal injury: Kline v. Zuckerman, 4 Pa. D. & C. 227 (Phila. C.P. 1924) (upheld
cause of action); Jacketti v. Pottstown Rapid Transit Co., 67 Montg. Co. L. Rptr. 37 (Pa. C.P.
1950) (followed Berlin and denied a cause of action); Rimpa v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 37 Erie
267 (Pa. C. P. 1953) (followed Berlin, although if the question would have been open, the
court would have in all likelihood taken the opposite view); Von Elbe v. Studebaker-Packard
Corp., 15 Pa. D. & C.2d 635 (Allegheny C.P. 1958) (upheld the right of action).
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viability as the standard in reliance upon the recognition by medical
authorities that a child comes into existence from the "moment of
conception."24 The court also noted that the notion of viability had
little to do with the fetus' basic right to recover.25
Several factors support the court's holding. First, the point of
viability is difficult to ascertain since its determination is dependent
upon several variables used to predict the likelihood of extrauterine
survival, such as fetal age or weight.26 Second, the constant advances
being made in embryology produce a constant state of flux as the
medical interpretation of viability changes. 7 The Supreme. Court
recognized this inexactitude of viability in Roe v. Wade2 8 when it
deferred the determination of viability to the professional judgment
of the physician as a medical decision on a case-by-case basis. 29
Last, allowing the point of viability to be made by the attending phy-
sician in each individual case, merely adds to the arbitrariness of the
standard.
The viability standard and other arbitrary developmental re-
quirements should be eliminated altogether. In its place, the reliable
medical proof of causation should be used in prenatal injury cases.30
An unborn child is no less injured regardless of the stage at which
the injury occurred.
Eliminating the viability standard in the recognition of prenatal
24. Sinkler, 401 Pa. at 273, 164 A.2d at 96. See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160-
61 (1973) (the majority opinion indicated that the official belief of the Catholic Church is that
life comes into existence from the moment of conception).
25. Sinkler, 401 Pa. at 273, 164 A.2d at 96. Other courts have likewise rejected the
continued use of the viability concept as an important factor in determining the rights of the
unborn. See, e.g., Vale Chemical Co. v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 340 Pa. Super.
510, 490 A.2d 896 (1985) (Relying upon Pennsylvania law espoused in Sinkler, the court
allowed recovery for injury suffered by a non-viable fetus in the first trimester as a result of its
mother's ingestion of the drug diethylstil-bestrol (DES). Damages were collected from the
insurance policy of the manufacturer of DES); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Bellefonte Ins. Co.,
490 F. Supp. 935 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (non-viable fetus harmed by a drug ingested by its mother
within the forty-fourth day of pregnancy was held to be capable of sustaining bodily injury,
thus, the fetus was entitled to recovery within the drug manufacturer's insurance policy).
These cases demonstrate that a non-viable fetus is recognized for insurance purposes.
26. Lenow, The Fetus as a Patient: Emerging Rights as a Person?, 9 AM. J. LAW &
MED. 1, 11 (1983) [hereinafter Fetus as a Patient].
27. Id.
28. 413 U.S. 113, 159 (1973).
29. Id. at 165. The Court found that, "when those trained in the respective disciplines of
medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this
point in the development of man's knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the an-
swer." Id. at 159. See also Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 63 (1976)
("[V]iability ... may vary with each pregnancy, and the determination of whether a particu-
lar fetus is viable is, and must be, a matter for the judgment of the responsible attending
physician."); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 391-94 (1979) (viability is reserved to the
individual physician's judgment on a case-by-case basis).
30. W. PROSSER, supra note 19, § 55, at 369.
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injuries would not undermine the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v.
Wade.31 The Roe decision only applied to the constitutional per-
sonhood of a fetus. Specifically, it stated that the protection of a
fetus' potentiality of life by permitting parents of a stillborn child to
maintain an action for wrongful death because of prenatal injuries
was not inconsistent with its decision not to recognize a fetus until
viability for purposes of abortion. s2 The distinction is that a wrongful
death action is brought to vindicate a parent's loss of the "potential-
ity of life"; whereas, the viability standard in Roe for the purpose of
abortion concerns a person "in the whole sense. '' as The rejection of
the viability standard may present a dilemma as Roe recognized that
a pregnant woman's discretion was inviolable prior to viability. By
allowing the recognition of a prenatal tort before viability, the state
may be interfering with the discretion that was preserved in Roe if
the injury was sustained prior to viability.
4
2. Abandonment of Live Birth as a Prerequisite.-Another
limitation that has precluded recovery for the infliction of prenatal
injuries has been the denial of access to the courts to the representa-
tives of a child not born alive. The majority of states have abandoned
the live birth prerequisite and allow the estate of a stillborn child to
maintain an action for wrongful death incurred as a result of prena-
tal injury. 5 Recovery for a stillborn child has often been dependent
upon the construction of a state's wrongful death statute, specifi-
cally, as to whether the legislature contemplated a fetus being a
"person" under the statute. 6
Pennsylvania was among one of the last of the states to recog-
nize the right of recovery for a stillborn child. In Amadio v. Levin, 3
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court abandoned the arbitrary "live
birth" and "still birth" standards that were used to determine an
unborn child's status as an individual under the Pennsylvania Sur-
vival38 or Wrongful Death statutes,39 directly overruling several pre-
31. Roe, 413 U.S. at 163. The Court recognized a state's "compelling" interest at viabil-
ity. It noted, "With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in potential life,
the 'compelling' point is at viability." Id.
32. Id. at 162.
33. Fetus as a Patient, supra note 26, at 8.
34. See infra notes 150-56 and accompanying text.
35. For a list of states that have allowed wrongful death actions for prenatal injuries, see
supra note 6.
36. W. PROSSER, supra note 19, § 55, at 369.
37. 509 Pa. 199, 501 A.2d 1085 (1985).
38. The Pennsylvania wrongful survival statute currently provides: "All causes of action
or proceedings, real or personal, shall survive the death of the plaintiff or of the defendant, or
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viously decided cases.4" In Amadio, the child was delivered stillborn
as the result of the negligence of the mother's obstetricians. In recog-
nizing an unborn child who is subsequently stillborn as an indepen-
dent life, the court concluded that "[n]o longer will we sanction a
legal doctrine that enables a tortfeasor who causes death to escape
full liability, while rendering one whose wrongdoing is less severe in
its consequences answerable in a wrongful death or other negligence
action merely because his victim survives birth."'1  By limiting the
right to bring an action to those children born alive, the court had
perpetuated a situation that made it "more profitable for the defend-
ant to kill the plaintiff than to scratch him."' 2
Previously, Pennsylvania courts denied the right to recovery for
a stillborn fetus because causation and damages were considered too
speculative and tenuous.4'3 The illusiveness of this argument became
apparent when the court recognized that the difficulties of proving
damages and causation posed no greater burden than making the
same determinations in the case of an injured fetus who survives de-
livery for only a few minutes or hours." The fear of double recovery
by parents, who also were entitled to their own independent action,
was allayed in Amadio when the court deemed the fetus' injury as
separate from that of the parents' injury. Furthermore, the court
found that even though the parents are normally the primary benefi-
ciaries of the damages recovered by the estate of the fetus, they are
not deemed to be avaricious or in receipt of double recovery.'5 The
the death of one or more joint plaintiffs or defendants." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8302
(Purdon 1982).
39. The Pennsylvania wrongful death statute currently provides: "An action may be
brought, under procedures prescribed by general rules, to recover damages for the death of an
individual caused by the wrongful act or neglect or unlawful violence or negligence of another
if no action for damages was brought by the injured individual during his lifetime." 42 PA.
CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 8301(a) (Supp. 1987).
40. Scott v. Kopp, 494 Pa. 487, 431 A.2d 959 (1981); Marko v. Philadelphia Transp.
Co., 420 Pa. 124, 216 A.2d 502 (1966); and Carroll v. Skloff, 415 Pa. 47, 202 A.2d 9 (1964).
See also Justice v. Booth Maternity Center, 345 Pa. Super. 529, 498 A.2d 950 (1985). Accord
Gullborg v. Rizzo, 331 F.2d 557 (3d Cir. 1964). In Gullborg, the court was required to deter-
mine whether the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would hold that a cause of action could be
maintained by a stillborn infant for prenatal injuries sustained as a viable fetus under the
state's Wrongful Death and Survival statutes. The court predicted that such an action could be
maintained, explaining that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Sinkler demon-
strated a tendency on the part of the court to align itself with other jurisdictions that have
taken a liberal view and have allowed recovery by a stillborn fetus for prenatal injuries sus-
tained when viable. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
41. Amadio, 509 Pa. at 205, 501 A.2d at 1088.
42. Id. (citing W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 127 (4th ed. 1971)).
43. See Scott, 494 Pa. at 491, 431 A.2d at 961; Carroll, 415 Pa. at 49, 202 A.2d at 11.
44. Amadio, 509 Pa. at 205-06, 501 A.2d at 1088.
45. Amadio, 509 Pa. at 206, 501 A.2d at 1088.
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consequence of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in
Amadio was to make the right of recovery available to a fetus subse-
quently born alive equally available to a stillborn fetus.
III. Absence of Status in Criminal Law
When the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ultimately allowed re-
covery by a stillborn fetus in Amadio, it specifically abstained from
determining the criminal consequences of causing the death of a fe-
tus.46 This question, however, had been addressed in Pennsylvania in
Commonwealth v. Brown.7 The defendant in Brown stabbed his
pregnant wife,8 twelve times, fatally wounding her in the neck,
chest, abdomen, and heart. As a result, Mrs. Brown died within min-
utes of the attack and the fetus died in her uterus. The defendant
was charged with criminal homicide of the mother and of the fetus.
The court, however, decided that since the fetus was not subse-
quently born alive and did not exist independently of its mother, its
death could not be criminal homicide.49
The homicide charge for the fetus was dismissed in Brown be-
cause under Pennsylvania's homicide statute "[a] person is guilty of
criminal homicide if he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or negli-
gently caused the death of another 'human being.' "' The term
"human being" as used in this section means a person who has been
born alive. A fetus, not yet being born, is not a "human being" and
cannot be a victim of a homicide in Pennsylvania.
Retention of the "born alive" rule in criminal law seems to be
archaic in light of its abolition in Amadio as an arbitrary require-
ment in the area of tort law. 5 1 The Pennsylvania Crimes Code fails
46. Id. at 208, 501 A.2d at 1089. But see Annotation, Homicide Based on Killing of
Unborn Child, 40 A.L.R.3d 444 (1971, Supp. 1987).
47. 6 Pa. D. & C.3d 627 (C.P. Chester 1978). The court found no appellate cases that
addressed the subject of the killing of a fetus. Three trial court decisions cited by the court are
in complete accord with the common law enunciated by Sir Edward Coke. See infra notes 51,
54 and accompanying text. These include: Commonwealth v. Riley, 88 Pa. D. & C. 572, 69
Montg. Co. L. Rptr. 306 (1953) (Mother was declared not guilty since the fetus had been
born dead and was incapable of external existence.); Commonwealth v. O'Donohue, 8 Phila.
623 (Pa.C.P. 1871) (Mother found not guilty of murder because it could not be proven that
the child had been born alive and had a complete and separate existence apart from its mother
even though its lungs were inflated. The court was unable to determine if the child had
breathed during or after birth.); Pennsylvania v. McKee, I Add. 1 (1791) (Mother was
charged with concealing the death of her bastard child, but was found not guilty because the
jury found that the baby was born dead.).
48. Mrs. Brown was carrying a viable male fetus that was thirty-six to thirty-eight
weeks in gestation.
49. Brown, 6 Pa. D. & C.3d at 662.
50. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2501(a) (Purdon 1983).
51. Amadio, 509 Pa. at 205, 501 A.2d at 1088.
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to define murder, but since the Code is merely a codification of the
common law," the Brown court looked to its common law definition
to determine whether a fetus can be the subject of murder as a
"human being." 53 The court relied upon a common law principle
written by Sir Edward Coke in the mid-seventeenth century which
states:
If a woman be quick with childe, and by a potion or other-
wise killeth it in her wombe, or if a man beat her, whereby the
childe dyeth in her body, and she is delivered of a dead childe,
this is a great misprison [misdemeanor] and no murder; but if
the childe be born alive and dyeth of the potion, battery or other
cause, this is murder; for in law it is accounted a reasonable
creature in rerum natura, when it is born alive."'
Absent a statute expressly altering this common law definition,
the court refused to consider the intentional killing of a fetus as
criminal homicide. The court reasoned that applying the homicide
statute in this case would have been creating a criminal offense
where none had before existed. They considered that such a finding
would be an encroachment on the prerogative of the legislature.55
Clearly, the Pennsylvania legislature did not intend the homicide
statute to include an act of feticide that prohibited the fetus from
being born alive.56
The plight of the unborn under the criminal law in Pennsylvania
is the majority view in the United States.57 The decision in Roe v.
52. The Pennsylvania Penal Code abolishes common law crimes from the Crimes Code
in Pennsylvania and provides that "no conduct constitutes a crime unless it is a crime under
this title or another statute of this Commonwealth." 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 107(a) (Pur-
don 1983). The Code, however, does not abolish the common law definitions unless they are
inconsistent with the statute. Brown, 6 Pa. D. & C.3d at 632 (citing S. TOLL, PA. CRIMES
CODE ANN. § 107 (1974)).
53. Brown, 6 Pa. D. & C.3d at 633.
54. Id. at 635 (quoting 3 COKE, INSTITUTES 58 (1648)).
55. Brown, 6 Pa. D. & C.3d at 660.
56. Id. at 639 (Under Pennsylvania law, "the killing of a fetus was regarded as murder
only if the fetus was born alive, lived for an interval, no matter how brief, and then died as the
result of injuries inflicted before or during birth.").
57. See, e.g., People v. Greer, 79 Ill. 2d 103, 402 N.E.2d 203 (1980) (Defendant caused
the death of an eight-month-old fetus when he allegedly beat his pregnant girlfriend with his
fists, kicked her with his feet, and struck her repeatedly with a broomstick, which broke during
the course of the beating. Defendant escaped prosecution as the court concluded that taking
the life of a fetus was not murder under the state's homicide law unless the fetus was born
alive and subsequently expired as a result of the injuries.); Hollis v. Commonwealth, 652
S.W.2d 61 (Ky. 1983) (Husband of estranged wife did not want the baby she was carrying so
he forced his hand up her vagina and caused the death of the twenty-eight to thirty-week old
fetus. The criminal charges against the husband were dismissed in reliance on the common-law
live birth requirement.). But cf. People v. Bolar, 109 Ill. App. 3d 384, 440 N.E.2d 639 (1982)
(Defendant was prosecuted for reckless homicide which caused the death of an eight-month-
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Wade specifically recognized the state's "important and legitimate
interest in protecting the potentiality of human life." 58 Through the
introduction of legislation, a number of states have taken the initia-
tive to afford protection to the unborn from abuse or neglect.59 The
goal of this legislation is to criminalize harmful acts against the un-
born and to deter future crimes. The success of these attempts, how-
ever, has been varied and often incomplete.
A. Limitations of Legislation
The states that have afforded legislative protection to the fetus
through their criminal laws include: California,60 Florida,
6' Illinois, 6 2
Louisiana,6" Minnesota,"" and Rhode Island. 6 These laws afford in-
old fetus who survived two minutes subsequent to birth.); People v. Guthrie, 97 Mich. App.
226, 293 N.W.2d 775 (1980) (Defendant struck a woman the day before she was scheduled to
enter the hospital for a caesarean delivery, but was found immune from prosecution as the
court found that the alteration of the born alive rule was the prerogative of the legislature and
not the judiciary.); State v. Anderson, 135 N.J. Super. 423, 343 A.2d 505 (1975) (Defendant
was convicted of the murders of seven-month-old twins who both survived for only a limited
period of time after delivery. The twins' deaths resulted from injuries sustained after the de-
fendant discharged a gun into their mother.).
58. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162. The court recognized the legitimacy of state laws allowing
tort recovery for wrongful death actions due to prenatal injuries and laws conferring inheri-
tance rights on the unborn. Id.
59. See infra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
60. The California Penal Code provides in pertinent part: (a) "Murder is the unlawful
killing of a human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought." CAL. PENAL CODE § 187
(West 1987).
61. The Florida Penal Code provides: "The willful killing of an unborn quick child, by
any injury to the mother of such child which would be murder if it resulted in the death of
such mother, shall be deemed manslaughter, a felony of the second degree." FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 782.09 (West 1976).
62. The Illinois Penal Code provides in pertinent part:
(a) A person commits the offense of feticide who causes the death of a fetus
if, in performing the acts which caused the death, he, without lawful
justification:
(I) either intended to kill or do great bodily harm to the mother
carrying the fetus or knew that such acts would cause death or great
bodily harm to the mother; or
(2) he knew that his acts created a strong probability of death or
great bodily harm to the mother; or
(3) he was attempting or committing a forcible felony against the
mother other than second degree murder; and
(4) he knew, or reasonably should have known under all of the cir-
cumstances, that the mother was pregnant.
(b) For purpose of this Section, "fetus" means a fetus which the physician
or pathologist performing the fetal autopsy determines, based upon the particu-
lar facts of the case before him, to have been capable, at the time of its death, of
sustained life outside of the mother's womb with or without life support equip-
ment, and such capacity for sustained life is proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1.1(a)(b) (West Supp. 1987).
63. The Louisiana Penal Code provides: "'Person' includes a human being from the
moment of fertilization and implantation and also includes a body of persons, whether incorpo-
rated or not." LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.2(7) (West 1986).
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creased protection to the unborn from culpable conduct causing un-
lawful killing; however, their effect is limited.6 The most substantial
limitation that the statutes impose is a viability standard. Under the
California,6 7 Florida, Illinois and Rhode Island statutes, protection is
extended only to a viable fetus. The legislation is further hampered
by other limitations.
In Illinois, the statute limits the scope of protection by requiring
that the criminal actor intended to kill or do great bodily harm to
the mother or knew that his acts would pose such danger, attempted
or committed a felony against the mother, and knew or should have
known that the mother was pregnant.6 8 The effect of this statute is
to exclude from protection assaults on a woman who is not visibly
pregnant or otherwise not known to the actor to be pregnant, as well
as assaults on a pregnant woman that were meant to kill the fetus
with no intent to cause and no strong likelihood of causing, harm to
the woman.69
64. See infra note 77.
65. The Rhode Island Penal Code provides:
The willful killing of an unborn quick child by any injury to the mother of
such child, which would be murder if it resulted in the death of such mother, or,
the administration to any woman pregnant with a quick child of any medication,
drug, or substance whatever, or, the use of any instrument or device or other
means, with intent thereby to destroy such child, unless the same be necessary to
'preserve the life of such mother, shall in the event the death of such child be
thereby produced, be deemed manslaughter.
In any prosecution under this section, it shall not be necessary for the prose-
cution to prove that no such necessity existed.
"Quick child" - For the purposes of this section "quick child" shall mean
an unborn child whose heart is beating, who is experiencing electronically-mea-
surable brain waves, who is discernibly moving, and who is so far developed and
matured as to be capable of surviving the trauma of birth with the aid of usual
medical care and facilities available in this state.
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-5 (Michie 1981).
66. Parness, The Abuse and Neglect of the Human Unborn: Protecting Potential Life,
20 FAM. L.Q. 197, 203 (1986) [hereinafter Protecting Potential Life].
67. The California Appellate Court, in People v. Smith, 59 Cal. App. 3d 751, 129 Cal.
Rptr. 498 (1976), interpreted this provision as applicable only to a viable fetus asserting that:
The underlying rationale of [Roe v.] Wade, therefore, is that until viability
is reached, human life in the legal sense has not come into existence. Implicit in
[Roe v.] Wade is the conclusion that as a matter of constitutional law the de-
struction of a non-viable fetus is not the taking of human life. It follows that
such destruction cannot constitute murder or other form of homicide, whether
committed by a mother, a father (as here), or a third person.
Id. at 757, 129 Cal. Rptr.
68. See supra note 62.
69. See Protecting Potential Life, supra note 66, at 204. Despite the limitations of the
Illinois statute, a person was convicted under the statute for the first time since its adoption in
August 1981. Reaves, First Feticide Test, 71 A.B.A. J. Jan. 1985, at 19. The defendant was
convicted of the rape and shooting death of a woman who was nine months pregnant. The
woman had begun partial labor, which led to the suffocation death of the fetus. The defense
attorney felt that this case was not a good test of the law since the pregnancy was "so far
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In California and Florida, the statutes fail to protect the fetus
from harmful acts causing injuries other than death. The fetus is
protected from harmful acts causing death, but is completely unpro-
tected from acts that do not cause death in these states.70 This inade-
quacy became very apparent when the San Diego Municipal Court
dismissed criminal charges against a woman who used amphet-
amines against the advice of her doctor during her pregnancy. Her
son was born brain-dead but survived on life support systems before
dying five weeks later. 71 Intentional conduct that causes disabilities
at birth impairing a fetus' future quality of life should be as criminal
as the termination of the potentiality of future life. 2 The legislature
must realize that a fetus can be a victim of crime when the injury is
less than the deprivation of life.73
Instead of creating a separate statute to extend protection of the
unborn, Louisiana merely amended the definition of "person" in its
criminal code to include "a human being from the moment of fertili-
zation and implantation. 17 ' This broad attempt, however, proved to
be unsuccessful. The Louisiana Supreme Court later ruled that when
the word "person" was extended to include a fetus the legislative
intent was not to specifically amend the homicide statute to include
feticide.75 Accordingly, since feticide cannot be made a crime by im-
plication, the mere extension of the definition of "person" did not
broaden homicide to include feticide.7
6
The Minnesota legislature recently passed the most comprehen-
sive protection of the unborn." The Minnesota laws criminalize acts
along." A better test of the law could have been made if the mother had been only five or six
months pregnant.
70. Id.
71. See Fetal Abuse. supra note 2. See also Reyes v. Superior Ct., 75 Cal. App. 3d 214,
141 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1977) (heroin-addicted pregnant woman was found immune from prosecu-
tion for endangering the lives of her twin boys who were subsequently born addicted to her-
oin); Love v. State, 450 So. 2d 1191 (Fla. App. 1984) (defendant, who allegedly shot child's
mother when she was eight months pregnant, was found not guilty of battery to an infant who
required surgery to have a bullet removed from its head subsequent to birth).
72. Protecting Potential Life, supra note 66, at 208.
73. Id.
74. See supra note 63.
75. State v. Brown, 378 So. 2d 916, 918 (La. 1979). The minutes of the Senate Com-
mittee of the Judiciary, however, indicated that the purpose of the bill was to "include human
beings (as "persons") from the moment of conception and therefore entitled to every protection
of law." Id. (emphasis added).
76. Id.
77. MINN. STAT. § 609.21(4) (1987) (criminal vehicular operation resulting in injury to
the unborn child); §§ 609.2661, 609.2662 and 609.2663 (1987) (murder of an unborn child in
the first, second, and third degree); §§ 609.2664 and 609.2665 (1987) (manslaughter of an
unborn child in the first and second degree); §§ 609.267, 609.2671 and 609.2672 (1987) (as-
sault of an unborn child in the first, second, and third degree); and § 609.268 (1987) (injury or
92 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW SPRING 1988
causing the termination of life prior to live birth as well as acts
which cause injuries other than the termination of life.78 The Minne-
sota legislature even recognizes an unborn child from the time of
conception.79 Minnesota, however, created a large gap in its protec-
tion of the unborn when it excluded, by definition,8 a any acts against
the unborn by the mother herself.
The attempts by the legislatures of these states are evidence
that there is a state interest in protecting a fetus from culpable con-
duct. The distinction between whether the injury is caused by a third
party or the mother herself should be of no consequence because the
fetus is injured in either circumstance. States which have not af-
forded a fetus even the minimum protection from third parties, such
as Pennsylvania, are still following the archaic mid-seventeenth cen-
tury common law principle that requires fetuses to be born alive
before they are recognized as persons. This appears to be a contra-
dictory position for Pennsylvania since its courts have abandoned
this rule in tort law but continue to follow it in criminal law.
B. Legislation Against Parental Fetus Abuse
One commentator has recognized the need for the legislature
"to extend laws regarding child protection to cover the human un-
born, so that potential parents become legally responsible for many
abusive and neglectful acts that threaten harm to their unborn chil-
dren."81 The Oregon legislature is considering legislation that would
specifically allow for the prosecution of mothers who harm their un-
born babies by taking drugs. 2 If the legislation is approved, it would
be a Class A misdemeanor8 to knowingly or recklessly injure a fetus
by taking drugs. Although the coverage of the legislation is not lim-
ited to injuries caused by illegal drugs, injuries caused by alcohol
and cigarettes were not intended to be within the scope of the legis-
lation.8 4 The exclusion of alcohol and cigarettes was made because
the legislation is designed to protect children born addicted to illegal
death of an unborn child in the commission of a crime).
78. Protecting Potential Life, supra note 66, at 210.
79. MINN. STAT. § 609.266 (1987). "Unborn child" means the unborn offspring of a
human being conceived, but not yet born. Id.
80. MINN. STAT. § 609.266 (1987). "Whoever" does not include the pregnant woman.
Id.
81. Protecting Potential Life, supra note 66, at 208.
82. U.P.I., Feb. 10, 1987 (Nexis, Nexis library, wires file).




drugs. The bill is not punitive in nature, but it is designed to place
the mother into a drug treatment program and to prevent the child
from being placed into a home where further abuse may occur.85
This unique approach has the potential to be effective; however, its
actual value will have to be proven.
Recently, Ohio has been faced with a case wherein a woman
created a substantial risk to her baby through the use of cocaine
during her pregnancy.8" Both the mother and the infant tested posi-
tive for cocaine abuse, and the mother was indicted on a charge of
child endangering."" This case is expected to be a test case for Ohio
as it is believed to be the first of its kind in that state.88 The prosecu-
tor plans to advance the theory that, even though the abuse took
place while the baby was a fetus, the abuse continued after the fetus
was born because of the child's addiction to the cocaine.
89
This theory is currently used in England."' If it is successfully
shown that as a result of the parent's conduct the child's "proper
development is being avoidably prevented or neglected or his health
is being avoidably impaired or neglected or he is being ill treated," a
magistrate may order that the baby be removed from the mother at
85. Id.
86. Mother's Drug Addiction Leads to Child Endangering Charge, U.P.I. Mar. 13,
1987 (Nexis, Nexis library, wires file) [hereinafter Mother's Drug Addiction].
87. A charge of child endangering is also plausible in Pennsylvania. The applicable stat-
ute provides that "[a] parent, guardian, or other person supervising the welfare of a child
under 18 years of age commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if he knowingly endangers
the welfare of the child by violating a duty of care, protection or support." 18 PA. CoNs. STAT.
ANN. § 4304 (1983). The Official Comment to this section states that the offense "involves the
endangering of the physical or moral welfare of a child by an act or omission." 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 4304 (Supp. 1987).
88. See also In re Baby X, 97 Mich. App. 111, 293 N.W.2d 736 (1980). The Michigan
Court of Appeals held that prenatal conduct and treatment can be considered probative of a
child's neglect and found that "a newborn suffering narcotics withdrawal symptoms as a conse-
quence of prenatal maternal drug addiction may properly be considered a neglected child." Id.
at 116, 293 N.W.2d at 739. The court compared this situation to cases in which the court
found that the prior mistreatment of one child can support neglect allegations regarding an-
other child. But see Reyes v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. App. 3d 214, 141 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1977).
A heroin-addicted woman, who ignored a warning that she would be placing the health and
even the life of her unborn child in danger if she continued to use heroin and seek prenatal
medical care, gave birth to twin boys that were addicted to heroin and suffered from with-
drawal. The California Appellate Court held that § 273(a)(1) of the Penal Code "itself
strongly suggests that the section was not intended to be applicable to prenatal conduct," thus,
the woman could not be charged with felonious child endangering. 75 Cal. App. 3d at 217, 141
Cal. Rptr. at 914.
89. See Mother's Drug Addiction, supra note 86. In formulating this argument, the
prosecutor was guided by a recent ruling of a juvenile court judge that took away custody of a
child whose parents suffered a drug addiction. Id.
90. Bainham, Protecting the Unborn - New Rights in Gestation?, 50 MOD. L. REV.
361, 361 (1987) [hereinafter Protecting the Unborn]. See also Freeman, Removing Babies at
Birth: A Questionable Practice, 10 FAM. LAW 131 (1980) (analysis of the justness of the
practice in England of removing babies from their parents at birth).
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birth. 1 Although such evidence of past conduct toward the fetus is
now considered, it is not per se proof. In addition, it must also be
shown that the impairment of the child's development or health will
continue in the weeks and months following birth."2
Even though English courts have recognized a cause of action
for the abuse of a fetus under England's Children and Young Per-
sons Act of 1969, they do not confer legal status upon the unborn
until birth because they still adhere to the "born alive" principle. 93
Thus, the scope of the English legislation is limited to the protection
of the child once it is born through the use of evidence of prenatal
conduct of the parents. It does not afford the fetus itself any direct
protection. One commentator noted the inconsistency of the distinc-
tion between "conduct that harms a child after birth, from the mate-
rialization of the danger after birth that was inflicted in utero" and
concluded that "[tihere is little logic in this distinction, however,
since ultimately the child is injured in both instances. The precise
time of injury should not be legally significant."' 4 The legislation
may have a deterrent effect because a mother, by failing to take an
appropriate amount of care during pregnancy, runs the risk of losing
her child after birth instead of being subject to criminal sanctions."'
Although taking a child away may be punishment to the parents, the
question remains whether such punishment is direct enough to deter
substance abuse.
IV. The Problem of Maternal Substance Abuse
Having established that there is a definite trend toward protec-
tion of the fetus through liability in tort law as well as criminal law,
a new issue has emerged in the area of prenatal liability-maternal
substance abuse. The point of contention is the extent and scope of
duty, if any, that a pregnant woman owes to her future child. 9 The
emergence of this issue is due to medical progress surpassing the
scope of current legal principles. Increased awareness of the impor-
91. Protecting the Unborn, supra note 90, at 361 (excerpt from the Children and Young
Persons Act 1969, § 1(2)(a)). In D. (A minor) v. Berkshire County Council, [1987] I All E.R.
20 (Div. Court); 27 (C.A.) and 33 (H.L.), the mother's willful and knowing abuse of drugs
during her pregnancy caused her child to be born an addict. These circumstances prompted
the English court to remove the baby from its mother.
92. Protecting the Unborn, supra note 90, at 363-64 (referring to Lord Goff's decision in
D. (A minor) v. Berkshire County Council).
93. Protecting the Unborn, supra note 90, at 366-67.
94. Maternal Su6stance Abuse, supra note 2, at 1228.
95. See infra note 88.
96. Prenatal Injury, supra note I1, at -.
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tance of responsible prenatal care and the dangers that are inherent
in certain behavior during pregnancy have created a "new" realm of
rights and obligations for pregnant women.
A direct link between fetal disorders and particular substances
has been established.97 This link has been firmly established for some
time between cigarette smoking and development of the fetus. Ciga-
rette smoking can cause low birth weights that increase the harm to
the fetus from other risks such as respiratory distress syndrome, hy-
poglycemia, jaundice, spontaneous abortions, Sudden Infant Death
Syndrome and deficiencies in the child's physical growth, behavior,
and intellectual and emotional development.9"
It has been estimated that five to fifteen percent of American
women drink heavily during pregnancy. As a result, fifty to seventy
percent of these women will deliver abnormal infants.99 A conserva-
tive estimate indicates that between 1800 and 2400 new cases of fe-
tal alcohol syndrome (FAS) will develop each year in the United
States. 100 The pervasiveness of alcohol consumed by a pregnant wo-
man is very apparent. "Following ingestion, alcohol diffuses across
all cell membranes, and is distributed throughout all body tissues in
proportion to their tissue water content. After formation of the pla-
centa, alcohol passes from the mother to the fetus, and alcohol con-
centration in the fetus approaches maternal concentration.' 0 1
When the alcohol reaches the fetus "[i]t can stop or slow the
birth of specific cells needed for development, cause cell death or
affect enough cells so an organ or tissue does not function prop-
erly."102 A recent study found that alcohol consumption during preg-
nancy may affect the fetus' future ability to have children. Alcohol
seems to affect the brain's control of reproduction that may lead to
the disruption of the female fetus' future ovulation cycle.' 03 The im-
plications of a woman's alcohol consumption during pregnancy can
now possibly span three generations.
97. Maternal Substance Abuse, supra note 2, at 1210.
98. Id. at 1218.
99. Prenatal Injury, supra note II at
100. Maternal Substance Abuse, supra note 2, at 1212 (FAS is a specific pattern of
structural anomalies which occur in some offspring of women who consume alcohol during
pregnancy). See also U.P.., June 22, 1987 (Nexis, Nexis library, wires file). According to Dr.
Kevin Rudeen of the University of Missouri-Columbia School of Medicine, FAS can cause low
birth weight, mental retardation and physical deformities. FAS has only been a recognized
medical disorder since the 1970's.
101. Maternal Substance Abuse, supra note 2, at 1211.
102. U.P.I., June 22, 1987 (Nexis, Nexis library, wires file).
103. Id. Since the male reproductive system is not as cyclical as the female's, it is not as
easily monitored. It is, therefore, more difficult to document alcohol's effect upon the male
system.
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Another area of substance abuse that has been linked to fetal
disorders within the past thirty years has been drug addiction."0 4 Al-
though the long term effects of heroin addiction at birth are still
uncertain, the short term effects include neurologic or behavioral ab-
normalities, lack of attention span, and cognitive deficits, in addition
to severe withdrawal symptoms of vomiting, shrill crying, diarrhea,
and seizures. 1 5
About six or seven years ago cocaine babies began to appear
and are now estimated to make up half of the drug- afflicted babies
born.106 This statistic is not surprising as five million Americans are
now believed to use cocaine regularly.0 Babies born addicted to co-
caine are lethargic or catatonic at birth and sometimes exhibit con-
genital malformations. 10 8 When these babies are suffering with-
drawal symptoms, "their emotions are right on the edge;" they may
be screaming and inconsolable one moment and then fall asleep the
next. l0 9 Since cocaine withdrawal is more of a psychological with-
drawal rather than a physical withdrawal such as with heroin, co-
caine addicted babies cannot be weaned with a substitute drug. The
only effective treatment is to swaddle them in warm blankets to pro-
vide a sense of security and prevent the babies from thrashing
around and harming themselves." 0 Since this phenomenon is new,
doctors can only speculate as to the scope of problems that may be
experienced by these babies over the long term."'
In connection with maternal drug abuse is the possibility of the
mother contracting the deadly Acquired Immune Deficiency Syn-
drome (AIDS) virus 2 and passing it on to her fetus as a result of
intravenous drug use. The tragedy of fetuses being exposed to drugs
is compounded by their possible exposure to AIDS. The AIDS virus
is passed to fetuses from the mother by a similar process by which
they become exposed to drugs." 3 Prospective parents and the medi-
104. Maternal Substance Abuse, supra note 2, at 1217.
105. Id.
106. Prenatal Injury, supra note 11.
107. Id.
108. Maternal Substance Abuse, supra note 2, at 1217.
109. Cocaine Babies, supra note 1, at 54.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Cimons, Koop Calls for AIDS Test Before Any Pregnancy, L.A. Times, March 25,
1987, § 1, at 1, col. 4. AIDS destroys the body's immune system, leaving it powerless against
certain cancers and otherwise rare infections. The virus can also invade the central nervous
system, causing severe neurological disorders. It is commonly transmitted during anal and vag-
inal sexual intercourse, by the sharing of unsterilized hypodermic needles, or by woman to
fetus during pregnancy. Id.
113. Henry, Children With AIDS Get Assistance, U.PI., August 5, 1987 (Nexis, Nexis
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cal community are being urged to take steps to help reduce the ex-
pected rise in the number of babies born with the AIDS virus.1"
Public health officials have estimated that fifty percent of the
mothers infected with the AIDS virus will transmit the infection to
the fetus and approximately half of these infected fetuses will die
within the first fifteen months after birth.
11 5
Some infants who are exposed to drugs or AIDS have been
abandoned by their parents in hospitals because the parents are una-
ble to provide the infant with adequate care in its condition."' As a
result, these infants are "deprived of a warm and nurturing environ-
ment."' 17 To insure that these children receive the care they desper-
ately need, the Senate recently agreed to appropriate $20 million in
state aid to open special homes for "boarder-babies"-infants ex-
posed to drugs, afflicted with AIDS, or abandoned in hospitals for
other reasons." 8
The effect of AIDS on a fetus is even more catastrophic as the
infection moves more rapidly to the end-stage than in adults. " 9 The
risk to the mother also increases because once a pregnant woman has
tested positive for AIDS antibodies, the pregnancy appears to in-
crease her chances of developing AIDS.2 0 Consequently, doctors are
urged to counsel pregnant women who have tested positive for AIDS
about the possibility of abortion. 1  Of course, this suggestion has
met with strong opposition by anti-abortion activists who have re-
sponded that "[y]ou don't cure AIDS by killing the patient."' 2 The
problem posed by this situation, where the life of the mother may be
in danger due to carrying the fetus, adds a new facet to the balanc-
ing of the rights of the fetus with those of the mother.
Another area that has raised the issue of balancing the rights of
library, wires file) [hereinafter Children With AIDS].
114. Steinbrook, Steps to Reduce Rise of AIDS in Babies Urged, L.A. Times, February
21, 1987, § 11, at 1, col. I [hereinafter Steps To Reduce Rise of AIDS].
115. Id. Most of the 444 AIDS cases that have been reported have been transmitted
from a woman to her fetus. Also, the U.S. Public Health Service estimates that by 1991 there
will be 3,000 babies and young children with AIDS. Since the risk of contracting AIDS from
blood transfusions has become minimal due to better screening techniques, most of the new
cases will occur as a result of transmissions from mother to fetus. Id.
116. Children with AIDS, supra note 113.
117. Id.
118. Id. The legislation now goes to the House for approval.
119. Id.
120. Id. An adult who tests positive for AIDS antibodies is estimated to have a 30% to
50% chance of becoming ill with AIDS within five years. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. (quoting Susan Carpenter-McMillan, a spokeswoman for the Right to Life
League in Los Angeles).
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a fetus with those of its mother is the area of fetal therapy. The
expanding ability of the medical profession to diagnose prenatal dis-
orders and to treat them in utero with drugs, surgery, or possibly by
gene therapy has given rise to cases involving forced fetal treatment.
The courts have allowed such treatment when the treatment will
benefit a viable, full-term fetus and the risk of the injury to the
mother is reasonable.12 If the procedure subjects the mother to sub-
stantial risk, the court will weigh the risks of the surgery to the
mother against its benefits for the unborn child.124 In regard to the
mother subjecting her child to the AIDS virus, it may be possible to
treat fetuses infected with AIDS in the womb with the drug AZT.
125
As of the writing of this Comment, the drug has not been tested on
pregnant women. The courts may soon be asked to weigh the poten-
tial benefits of the drug to the fetus against the effect of the drug on
the mother. Forced fetal treatment for a condition not necessarily
caused by the mother seems to be more of an intrusion upon the
rights of a woman than the proscription of an illegal substance dur-
ing pregnancy. A mother's substance abuse is a reckless harm to the
fetus, and its proscription can be beneficial to the mother herself.
V. Extension of Rights Into the Area of Maternal Substance
Abuse
The need to extend the rights of the fetus has become evident
with the increased awareness of the effects that maternal substance
abuse has on the fetus. Once the need for protection has been estab-
lished, the plausibility of this extension must be examined. The past
several years have seen some progress toward protection of the fetus
from a mother's tortious conduct.
The right of a fetus to recover against its mother for negligently
inflicted prenatal injury has been recognized by several states. Mich-
igan was the first state to recognize a child's right to recover for
injuries sustained from the negligent prenatal conduct of its mother.
The Michigan Court of Appeals, in Grodin v. Grodin,'21 held that a
child could recover from his mother for damages he suffered as a
123. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and
Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405, 445 (1983) [hereinafter Procreative Liberty].
124. Id. at 446. See also Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions & Interventions: What's Wrong
With Fetal Rights, 10 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 9 (1987); Note, Lifesaving Medical Treatment
for the Nonviable Fetus: Limitations on State Authority Under Roe v. Wade, 54 FORDHAM L.
REV. 961, 963 n. 11 (1986).
125. Leary, Treatment of Unborn AIDS Victims May Be Possible, A.P., June 26, 1987
(Nexis, Nexis library, wires file).
126. 301 N.W.2d 869 (Mich. App. 1980),
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result of her use of the drug tetracycline throughout her preg-
nancy.127 As a result of her continuous use of the drug, the child
developed brown and discolored baby teeth. Upon finding that her
behavior was unreasonable, the court held that liability for negli-
gently inflicted prenatal injury could be imposed.128
The court found that a woman's decision to take drugs during
pregnancy is an exercise of her discretion. The focal question, there-
fore, was whether her decision was a "reasonable exercise of paren-
tal discretion." 29 If the mother's conduct was found to be unreason-
able, parental immunity would not be an available defense. 130 In
reaching its decision, the court relied on the Michigan Supreme
Court's determination in Womack v. Buchharn13 1 that "a child has a
legal right to begin life with a sound mind and body. If the wrongful
conduct of another interferes with that right, . . . damages for such
harm should be recoverable by the child."' 2 By referring to the con-
duct of "another," the court did not limit the parties who may be
held liable for negligently inflicting injury. Thus, the court in Grodin
concluded that a child's mother would bear the same liability for
negligent prenatal behavior as would a third person. 3 '
In Stallman v. Youngquist,34 an Illinois state court recognized
the right of a child to maintain a tort action against her mother for
prenatal injuries suffered as a result of her mother's involvement in a
car accident.' 35 Allowing the child to recover, the Illinois court held
that the parental tort immunity doctrine will not protect parents
127. Id. at 871. The mother alleged that she took the drug without knowledge that she
was seven months pregnant, but stopped taking the drug once she was told that she was preg-
nant. The child asserted that his mother was negligent for her failure to seek proper prenatal
care, for her failure to request a pregnancy test, and for her failure to inform her doctor that
she was taking the drug. The mother also alleged that she was assured by her doctor that it
was impossible for her to become pregnant. Id. at 869-70.
128. Id. at 871.
129. Id. (quoting Plumley v. Klein, 388 Mich. 1, 199 N.W.2d 169 (1972)).
130. Id. Michigan's intrafamily tort immunity doctrine was abolished by the Michigan
Supreme Court in Plumley v. Klein, 388 Mich. 1, 199 N.W.2d 169 (1972). The court held
that "[a] child may maintain a lawsuit against his parent for injury suffered as a result of the
alleged ordinary negligence of the parent . . . however, we note two exceptions to this new rule
of law: (1) where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of reasonable parental author-
ity over the child; and (2) where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of reasonable
parental discretion with respect to the provision of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental
services and other care." Plumley, 388 Mich. at 8, 199 N.W.2d at 172-73.
131. 384 Mich. 718, 187 N.W.2d 218 (1971).
132. Id. at 725, 187 N.W.2d at 222 (quoting Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 364-65,
157 A.2d 497, 503 (1960)) (emphasis added).
133. Grodin, 301 N.W.2d at 870.
134. 152 I1. App. 3d 683, 504 N.E.2d 920 (1987).
135. Id. at - , 504 N.E.2d at 925.
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from suits brought against them by their children.'1 6 The court, how-
ever, limited its holding to the circumstances of a case where the
injuries were caused by the mother's negligent operation of a motor
vehicle. 137 Only one paragraph in Stallman addressed the fetus' abil-
ity to maintain such an action.' 38 The impact of this case on the
right of a fetus to recover from its mother for prenatal injuries is
uncertain. The court refused to speculate as to the scope of its hold-
ing and reserved further consideration of the issue for a case by case
determination.'3 9 Nonetheless, the fact that these cases were liti-
gated demonstrates that a need for protection exists and that the
state has an interest in the protection of potential life against third
parties as well as against the fetus' own mother.
A. Abolition of Parental Immunity
In Falco v. Pados,"0 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court con-
cluded that "the doctrine of parental immunity has no rational pur-
pose today, and henceforth will not be recognized in Pennsylva-
nia.""' The court abrogated the parent-child tort immunity in
Pennsylvania without qualification. Making its decision, the court re-
jected the historical policy justifications for the doctrine. The first
justification for the doctrine was that allowing a child to sue a parent
for personal tort would disrupt family harmony."" The court pointed
out that "it is the injury itself which is the disruptive act" and not
the lawsuit.4 3 The second justification was the fear of collusion, per-
jury, and fraud between family members.'4 The court responded by
asserting that "it is much to be preferred that we depend upon the
efficacy of the judicial process to ferret out the meritorious from the
fraudulent rather than using a broad broom to sweep away a class of
claims, a number of which are admittedly meritorious.
In light of Pennsylvania's complete abolition of the parental im-
munity doctrine, Pennsylvania is a good candidate to recognize the
right of a fetus to recover from its mother for prenatal injuries. Un-
fortunately, other states have not reached this point and have either
136. See generally infra notes 140-49 and accompanying text.
137. Stallman, 152 II1. App. 3d at - , 504 N.E.2d at 926.
138. Id. at , 504 N.E.2d at 927.
139. Id. at __, 504 N.E.2d at 926.
140. 444 Pa. 372, 282 A.2d 351 (1971).
141. Id. at 376, 282 A.2d at 353.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 380, 282 A.2d at 355.
144. Id. at 375, 282 A.2d at 353.
145. Id. at 381, 282 A.2d at 356.
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remained loyal to the doctrine or have abolished it under special cir-
cumstances or subject to certain exceptions.14 One commentator has
noted that "[t]he majority of jurisdictions should recognize such a
duty to remain consistent with their policy justifications as set forth
in their decisions abolishing parental immunity and recognizing the
right of a child born alive to recover for prenatal injuries. '"147 Penn-
sylvania has abolished the parental immunity doctrine"' 8 without ex-
ception and has recognized a fetus' right to maintain an action for
the negligent infliction of prenatal injury by a third party whether
the fetus is born alive or stillborn.' 49 The next logical step is to rec-
ognize the right of a fetus to maintain an action for maternal sub-
stance abuse.
B. The Inherent Conflict with Maternal Autonomy
The inherent problem of expanding the rights of a fetus is the
concomitant infringement on the rights of the mother. Some feel
that the expansion of fetal rights is a direct intrusion on a woman's
constitutional liberty and privacy interests.' 50 This "interest" has
been labeled the right to procreate. 5' One commentator made a very
important distinction between "procreation" and "managing the
pregnancy" by stating that "[t]he maternal-fetal conflicts that arise
in managing pregnancy do not involve the woman's right to procre-
ate, but rather her right to bodily integrity in the course of
procreating. ' t55
The critical point of state intervention is when the woman
chooses to carry the fetus for the full term and not exercise her right
146. See supra note 130. For an in-depth comprehensive analysis of the status of paren-
tal immunity in each state and the likelihood that prenatal liability will be recognized, see
Beal, "Can I Sue Mommy?" An Analysis of a Woman's Tort Liability For Prenatal Injuries
to Her Child Born Alive, 21 SAN DIEGO L, REV. 325, 333-57 (1984) [hereinafter Can I Sue
Mommy?] (author concludes that "the fifty state jurisdictions have not reached a consensus on
parental liability, but rather have reached varied results along a wide spectrum").
147. Can I Sue Mommy?, supra note 146, at 357.
148. See supra notes 140-45 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 37-45 and accompanying text.
150. Note, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's Constitutional Rights
to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599, 614 (1986) [hereinafter Creation
of Fetal Rights]. See also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). The Court stated
that the fourteenth amendment liberty included "the right of the individual . . . to marry,
establish a home and bring up children." Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)
(Court stated that marriage and procreation are among "the basic civil rights of man.").
151. Procreative Liberty, supra note 123, at 414 n.22. The only cases that deal directly
with procreation are Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (involuntary sterilization) and
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (distinguishing the right to procreate from the right to
avoid procreation or the right to rear a child).
152. Procreative Liberty, supra note 123, at 437.
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to abort. Once the woman has made this decision she has assumed
an obligation to the fetus to bring it into the world in as healthy a
condition as possible, and at the same time, she has placed limits on
her freedom over her body. 5 If the woman makes the decision to
carry the fetus to term prior to viability some important questions
arise:
The pregnant woman's duty to the fetus before viability is more
difficult to determine if she has not yet decided whether she will
go through with the pregnancy. If she undertakes activities dan-
gerous to the fetus, she may obviate the issue by later deciding
to abort. But if she decides against abortion, will her dangerous
activity be actionable if the child is born damaged? The argu-
ment against such a duty is that the possible imposition of legal
penalties would encourage her to abort when she would other-
wise prefer not to. On the other hand, the threat of penalties will
encourage her to use due care during the period before viability,
when she may abort but has not yet chosen to. Once she decides
to abort, she will be free to engage in activities toxic to the fe-
tus. When she is undecided, however, she should have a duty to
avoid the harmful activities in case she decides not to abort."'
In the context of maternal substance abuse, the conflict is be-
tween the right of the fetus to be born free of such damaging sub-
stances and the mother's right to pursue a lifestyle that includes the
use of tobacco, alcohol and narcotics. 5 Since the use of these sub-
stances is not a fundamental right (the use of alcohol and tobacco is
merely a privilege and the use of narcotics is a crime), the state
should be able to "restrict lesser supposed rights" when the exercise
of such rights pose a serious risk of injury to the fetus.1 56 On bal-
ance, the amount of intrusion necessary to proscribe the use of such
substances is minimal when compared to the serious harm that can
be prevented.
C. Plea for Criminalization
Even though the protection of the fetus has grown in the area of
torts, there remains a large void of protection in the criminal law. A
fetus injured by the conduct of its mother during pregnancy may not
have the knowledge or means to vindicate its injury; consequently,
153. Id. at 437. "She has already exercised her right to procreate by conceiving and has
waived her right not to procreate by failing to abort the fetus prior to viability." Id. at 437-38.
154. Id. at 447 n.129.
155. Maternal Substance Abuse, supra note 2, at 1219.
156. Id. at 1220-21.
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the injury will go uncompensated and a wrong unredressed. Under
the criminal law, the state takes this responsibility because a crime is
an offense against the public at large. The purpose of assessing crim-
inal liability is to protect and vindicate the interests of the public as
a whole by punishing the offender, by reforming or rehabilitating the
offender, or by deterring others from similar conduct.157 In addition,
maternal fetal abuse should be criminalized because there are situa-
tions in which civil remedies will not be appropriate, adequate, or
available for the loss that has been incurred, especially when the loss
is life itself.
VI. Conclusion
The increased awareness of the effect that maternal substance
abuse has on a developing fetus has given rise to the need for the
extension of fetal rights to protect against this abuse. Great strides
have been made in the protection of the fetus from negligent as well
as criminal conduct of third parties, thereby establishing a valid
state interest in the protection of potential life. Pennsylvania has af-
forded the fetus complete protection against the negligent acts of
third parties, but has failed to recognize any fetal rights against neg-
ligent maternal behavior. In addition, Pennsylvania has left the fetus
completely unprotected from criminal acts that allow the killing of a
fetus without vindication. The inconsistency between the protection
of fetal rights against negligent conduct and criminal conduct must
be reconciled. The status of the law in Pennsylvania is ripe for this
extension in the area of maternal substance abuse.
Barbara Shelley
157. W. PROSSER, supra note 19, § 2, at 7.

